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DEMOCRATIC RESTRAINTS UPON THE POLICE
(Comments upon The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us,
by Professor Herbert L. Packer)
FRED E. INBAU*
To place the subject of democratic restraints
upon the police in its proper perspective, I would
like to start out by suggesting that much of today's
concern about the police stems from a confusion in
the minds of many persons with respect to two different functions of the police. One function is the
traditional one of the prevention and detection of
conventional crimes and the apprehension of conventional criminals; the other is the role that the police have played, or rather been forced to play, in the
controversy over the civil rights of minority groups.
Suggestive of this confusion is the fact that in
recent years there have been considerably fewer
instances of physical abuses of criminal suspects,
and less intrusions upon their constitutional rights
and privileges than ever before. For instance, the
so-called 3rd degree is a rare occurrence today;
thirty, twenty, or even ten years ago it was fairly
commonplace. And today the police are being better selected and far better trained than in the
earlier years. If this be so-and it is so-then why
are the police being subjected to more and more
restrictions in the performance of their duties with
respect to the conventional type of crime and
criminals? Why are their judicial "handcuffs" being
squeezed tighter and tighter?
The primary reason, in my opinion, is the public
identification of the police as the ones to blame and
hold responsible for the plight of minority groups
and the abuses of minority groups. The policeman
is the uniformed symbol of all of these social is.
He has come to represent a menace in the way of a
better life for the socially deprived.
Any thoughtful reflection will produce a realization that the police did not produce our slums or
our Negro and Puerto Rican ghettos; nor did the
police dream up the ideas of segregation and discrimination. Nevertheless, there exists a more or
less unconscious identification of the police as the
architects of it all. I suggest to you that even down
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Former Director, Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection
Laboratory.

South this architectural responsibility cannot be
fairly placed upon the police. To be sure, they have
served as the implements of some of the social
wrongs and oppressions, but they were not the
creators of any of them. I will also suggest to you
that even the so-called "red-neck" Southern sheriff
with his cattle-prod was not acting in a dictatorial
capacity; he was actually serving his community
in the manner in which the community wanted to
be served. His exercise of the power of suppression
was not assumed; it was conferred upon him,
tacitly, if not explicitly. In fixing primary blame,
therefore, place it where it belongs-upon the community at large.
In the development of this attitude, whereby the
policeman is the symbol of suppression and abuses
of minority groups, and in seeking to curb his power,
or even to render him harmless in that respect, the
fact has been overlooked that we must depend upon
these same policemen to protect us from the criminal element in our midst. For that we need his
skill, his courage-and the legal powers of his office.
Once we recognize that the police are not the
creators of our social ills with respect to minority
groups, and once we realize that we can advance
the cause of civil rights without emasculating the
police, we can then make a better judgment as to
what restraints should be imposed upon them in
the exercise of their conventional police responsibilities and functions.
Another, though unrelated factor, that has
clouded the thinking of many persons-including
some judges, lawyers and law professors-is the
impression many people receive when they hear
about the reversal of a criminal case, and particularly one reversed by the Supreme Court, on the
announced basis of "police misconduct". The assumption is that the police must have violated the
law or the Constitution itself. To be sure this has
occurred in some of the cases, as when coercive
methods have been used to obtain a confession, but
much of what the public has been hearing about
today does not involve that kind of conduct at all.
To the contrary, a number of the most publicized
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cases have centered about police practices and
procedures that were legally permissible at the time
they were employed but condemned later on as
improper. The public itself is seldom made aware of
this, so down again goes the image of the policeman.
The famous Escobedo case itself furnishes the best
1
example of the point I am trying to make. What
the police did to Escobedo, and what 5 of the 9
Justices found objectionable, had been labeled as
permissible in two of the Court's own decisions
rendered only 6 years before the Escobedo decision.
In Escodebo, the majority of the Court nullified a
confession obtained after the police had refused to
permit Escobedo's lawyer to confer with him. But
at the time of Escobedo's interrogation the police
were acting in accordance with the law as the
Supreme Court had said it was in Crooker v.
3
California and Cicenia v. La Gay, both of which
were decided by a closely divided court, just as was
Escobedo.
Incidentally, in addition to a reliance upon the
Crooker and Cicenia cases, the police interrogators
of Escobedo could have fortified themselves with
the clear and explicit language of the sixth
amendment which provides as follows: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to ... have the assistance of counsel for his
defense". There is not one word in the Constitution
or in any of its amendments to the effect that a
suspect has the right to counsel in the police station.
My point is that the police interrogators did not
deprive Danny Escobedo of any constitutional
rights as they existed at that time. But I will hazard
a guess that if the public at large were polled as to
whether the decision was based upon the Court's
finding that the police had violated Escobedo's
constitutional rights at the time of the interrogation practically every one of them would say "yes".
They might also be under the impression that
Escobedo had been physically abused, or threatened, or offered promises of leniency.
May I call your attention to another illustration
of how the public acquires an unfavorable impression of the police from their learning about the
reversal of a criminal case because of "police misconduct".
Much consideration is being given today to the
matter of whether a criminal suspect is entitled to
be warned of his self-incrimination privilege at
1Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
3357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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the beginning of a police interrogation. If and when
the Supreme Court reverses a case because the
police had not warned the defendant of his selfincrimination privilege-and I have no doubt that
this will occur-the impression the public will receive is that the police have goofed again. What
will not be realized-and not even by many judges,
lawyers and law professors-is that the highest
courts of over thirty states have consistently held
that it is unnecessary for the police to issue such a
warning.4 A similar conclusion was reached by the
5
Supreme Court itself many years ago. Only recently have a few state reviewing courts held the
warning to be necessary, and they have done so
upon the assumption that the Escobedo opinion
requires it, or that the Supreme Court will ultimately hold the warning to be a constitutional re0
quirement.
The point I want to make is that in those states
which have not overruled their earlier decisions
(that a warning is not necessary) the police cannot
fairly be charged with violating the constitutional
right of criminal suspects just because the Supreme
Court says later on that the warning must be given.
Now I should like to address myself to the issue
as to the ways and means for checking the police,
and also as to who should have a hand in the process.
In some of my earlier speeches and writings I
have expressed the view that it is not the constitutional function of the Supreme Court to police the
police. But even if this responsibility were rightfully within the power of the Court, the objective
is unachievable, largely because the Court is not
equipped with the knowledge, skill, or the ways and
means for policing the police. Much of what the
Court has been doing or attempting to do should be
left to the legislative and executive branches of
government.
To effectively "police the police," you must tell
the police what to do, as well as tell them what not
to do. They must be given some guidelines. What
4 See cases collected in INBAu & REID, CRIaNAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 162 (1962).

5Ibid. 163.
6For example, People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
398 P. 2d 361 (1965); State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487,398 P.
2d 482 '1965). Other state appellate courts, despite
Escobedo, have continued to follow their earlier precedents: People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.
2d 33 (1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 961; People v. Gunner,
15 N.Y. 2d 226, 205 N.E. 2d 852 (1965).
[The Court has since held, in its June 13th 5-4 decision
in Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966), that
the warning is now a constitutional requirement.]
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guidelines have they received from the Supreme
Court?
In a case decided some years ago, Trupiano v.
United States,7 the Supreme Court held that if the
police have the time in which to obtain a search
warrant and they fail to do so, the evidence they
seize, even pursuant to an otherwise reasonable
search, is inadmissible in court. Two years later, in
United States v. Rabinowitz,8 the Court overruled
the earlier case, holding that even though time
permitted, a failure to obtain a search warrant
would not nullify the validity of evidence obtained
from an otherwise reasonable search. Eleven years
thereafter, in Clpnmn v. United States,9 the Court
in effect overruled the second case and favored the
first one, although the Court's language is somewhat ambiguous. In Justice Clark's dissent in this
last case he had this to say:
Every moment of every day, somewhere in
the United States, a law enforcement officer
is faced with the problem of search and seizure.
He is anxious to obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field. It is the duty of
this Court to lay down those rules with such
clarity and understanding that he may be able
to follow them. For some years now the field
has been muddy, but today the Court makes
it a quagmire. It fashions a novel rule, supporting it with an old theory long since overruled.. .It is disastrous to law enforcement to
leave at large the inconsistent rules laid down
in these cases. It turns the well springs of
democracy-law and order- into a slough of
frustration. It turns crime detection into a
game of 'cops and robbers'. We hear much
these days of an increasing crime rate and
breakdown in law enforcement. Some place the
blame on police officers. I say there are others
that must shoulder much of that responsibility. 10
Another outstanding example of the Court's
vacillation was mentioned earlier: the overruling,
in the 1964 Escobedo decision, of two 1958 decisions
of Crooker v. Californiaand Cicenia,v. La Gay."
Complicating matters, of course, insofar as the
police are concerned, is the fact that Escobedo was
a 5-4 decision, as was the Crooker case. Cicenia
was 5-3, with one Justice abstaining; otherwise it,
too, would have been 5-4.
7 334 U.S. 699 (1948).

8339 U.S. 56 (1950).
9365 U.S. 610 (1961).
"IIbid. p. 622.
n Supra notes 2 and 3.

This turning on and off of the spout of constitutionality by a one-judge margin must inevitably
dull the non-lawyer policeman's respect for the
word "constitutional". To him it cannot be so
sacrosanct if at a given time it means one thing and
six years later it means something else. It is difficult for him to appreciate that this change can be
effected by a one man change of viewpoint. We
lawyers are equipped to understand these phenomena, but it is not easily accepted by non-lawyer
policemen.
Further complicating matters, not only for
policemen but also for police training school law
instructors-and even for prosecutors, defense
counsel and judges-is the ambiguous language in
the Court's opinions. Consider the confusion that
was created by Justice Goldberg's language in
E cobedo. The supreme courts of California and
Oregon and some other states have interpreted it to
require a warning of the right to remain silent and
of the right to counsel; in Illinois and New Jersey
and certain other states it has been given a different
interpretation." Moreover, in New Jersey the
federal Circuit Court of Appeals held contrary to
the New Jersey Supreme Court-a situation that
impelled Justice Weintraub of that Court to send
out a "pastoral letter" to all the state judges advising them to follow the decision of his court
rather than that of the federal circuit court."3
If lawyers and judges can be that confused, pity
the poor policeman who is told to be guided by
what the Supreme Court says.
Even within the Supreme Court of the United
States itself, the Justices seem to be confusing each
other. Don't take my word for this; listen, if you
will, to what some of the Justices themselves had
to say in the 1961 case of Columbe v. Connecticut,4
a case involving the question of the test to be applied in determining confession admissibility. The
majority opinion laid down this test:
The inquiry whether, in a particular case,
a confession was voluntarily or involuntarily
made involves, at the least a three-phased
process. First, there is the business of finding
the crude historical facts, the external, 'phenomenological' occurrences and events surrounding the confession. Second, because the
concept of 'voluntariness' is one which concerns a mental state, there is the imaginative
Supra note 6.
States ex rel Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F. 2d
429 (3rd Cir. 1965). As regards the "pastoral letter",
see New York Times, Dec. 11, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
1"367 U.S. 568 (1961).
1

13United
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recreation, largely inferential, of internal,
'psychological' fact. Third, there is the application to this psychological fact of standards
for judgment informed by the larger legal conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of
law but which, also, comprehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances. 5
Chief Justice Warren castigated the writer of the
majority opinion for this attempt at a general "clarification" of the test of admissibility. He said:
The opinion was unquestionably written
with the intention of clarifying these problems
and of establishing a set of principles which
could be easily applied in any coerced-confession situation. However, it is doubtful that
such will be the result, for while three members
of the Court agree to the general principles
enunciated by the opinion, they construe those
principles as requiring a result in this case exactly the opposite from that reached by the
author of the opinion. This being true, it cannot be assumed that the lower courts and
law enforcement agencies will receive better
guidance from the treatise for which this case
seems to have provided a vehicle. On an abstract level, I find myself in agreement with
some portions of the opinion and in disagreement with other portions. However, I would
prefer not to write on many of the difficult
questions which the opinion discusses until the
facts of a particular case make such writing
16
necessary.
Do you wonder why some of us are of the view
that the Supreme Court is not the agency or group
to tell the police what they can and cannot do? If
the views of the Justices cannot be stated any
more clearly than they were in the Columbe case
from which these quotes came, the opinions might
just as well be written in Latin.
In my opinion, a much more suitable agency of
government for providing the police with legal
guidelines is the legislative branch. In fact, much of
what some courts have been writing in the past few
years, and particularly the Supreme Court, has
been judicial legislation. And when constitutional
justifications have been invoked, the particular
constitutional provisions relied upon have sometimes been twisted far out of shape in order that
the court could impose its own conscience upon the
police and the public as well.
15Ibid. p. 603.
16Ibid. p. 635.

[Vo1.57

Workable guidelines are beyond the capacity of
the courts to formulate or administer. This is
especially true of the Supreme Court. The judiciary
also has enough to keep itself fully occupied at the
task of providing procedures to insure fair criminal trials and to protect the innocent from criminal convictions. The courts should focus their
attention upon such problems as providing defense
counsel to those who need it, the discovery rights
of the accused and the State, the hazards involved
in eye witness identifications and testimony and
the safeguards that should be established. The latter always presents the spectre of a conviction of
the innocent. These are the real and true functions
and responsibilities of the courts.
Much of the concern, energy, and efforts expended by the judiciary in trying to police the
police could be better spent in getting the judicial
house itself in order.
In some of this country's municipal and magistrate courts there are more and greater risks to the
innocent, more trampling over of basic individual
rights, and more affronts to human dignity than
you will find in the average police station. Those
of you who doubt that should pay a visit to some
of these courts and observe the cafeteria style
justice that is dispensed in them.
Perhaps the reason why the courts prefer to
police the police rather than attend to the needs of
the judicial house itself is the same as that which
accounts for the fact that it is much easier, and
much more pleasant, for any of us parents to think
up ways and means that should be employed in the
parental handling of the neighbor's children than
it is to correct the faults and control the mischief
of our own.
Why do I suggest that the legislature is the
better governmental agency for providing guidelines for the police?
In considering any or all phases of police conduct
or procedures in the enforcement of the law, a
legislature may establish commissions and appoint
committees to make studies, and formulate proposals. Hearings could be conducted, during the
course of which opposing viewpoints would be
presented and evaluated. At such hearings, persons
and groups with a broad interest in the subject
matter could be heard. Spokesmen for the police
interests would be present, along with representatives of citizen organizations, minority groups, and
others. These various viewpoints would not be so
confined as they are in a court case situation, where
ordinarily only counsel for the prosecution and
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defense are heard, and then primarily with regard
to the case facts and the law applicable to those
particular facts. Ultimately a, legislative decision
would be reached which is based upon considerations of policy and practicality, unaffected by the
shocking facts of an isolated case. I believe there
would be greater objectivity in such legislative
decision making. I also believe it would be more in
keeping with the traditions of a democratic form
of government than much of the decision making
that is now occurring in the Supreme Court, where
all too frequently the vote of a single Justice will
determine what the police may or may not do in
the performance of their duties.
Legislatures could also avail themselves of the
efforts of non-legislative groups such as the American Law Institute, or the A.B.A.'s Committee on
Minimum Standards of Criminal Justice. The recently drafted proposed Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, submitted by the Council of the
American Law Institute, represents a far better and
more workable set of controls over the police than
anything that has thus far emanated from
the Supreme Court. All of the American Law
Institute's efforts may go for naught, however, if
the Supreme Court should decide that there is a
constitutional prohibition against the detention
and interrogation of a criminal suspect unless he
has an attorney at his side.
Incidentally, the proposed Model Code is somewhat of a testimonial to the importance of police
interrogations in the investigation of criminal
offenses. And this brings me to the next point I wish
to make with reference to Professor Packer's paper.
He cites a statistical study made by Justice
Nathan R. Sobel of Kings County, N.Y. which purports to show that interrogations and confessions
are of little significance or value, implying that the
police can function effectively without interrogating criminal suspects. But Justice Sobel's interpretation of his statistics is highly invalid. He
surveyed 1000 indictments filed in King's County
Court during a certain period and found that only
in 86 of them did the prosecutor file the prescribed
"notice of intention" to use a confession, as required by New York procedure. From this Justice
Sobel concluded that "any estimate that confessions were involved in any large percentage of cases
or particular cases was a gross exaggeration". What
he overlooked, however, and this is pointed out in
the commentary to section 5.01 of the proposed
Model Code (f.n.6), is that the "notice of
intention" is filed only when a case is not disposed

of by a plea of guilty, and that such notices are not
filed in cases where the defendant's confession led
to other convincing evidence of guilt and the confession's use at the trial was considered to be
unnecessary.
Contrast Justice Sobel's statistics with those
gathered by the highly respected District Attorney
of New York County, Frank S. Hogan. Mr. Hogan
has reported that of 100 murderers who were executed in New York between 1943 and 1961, 85 of
them had given statements to the police which
were significantly helpful in their prosecution. Of
the currently pending cases in New York County,
involving 91 defendants charged with criminal
homicide, incriminating admissions were made by
62 of them. Hogan also reports that 25 of these
defendants could not have been indicted had it not
been for the confessions they had made to the
police.
More and more we are hearing of statistics and
and conclusions just as invalid as Justice Sobel's.
My own feeling is that there are some things we
can and should accept without demanding statistical proof, and the necessity for police interrogation
is one of them. A reflection upon the types of crimes
that confront our metropolitan police today should
convince anyone that many such cases cannot be
solved by any other means than the interrogation
of criminal suspects.17
Now I should like to get to the matter of civilian
review boards as a means of controlling the police.
Professor Packer urges the police to accept this
concept, for their own interest and welfare as well
as for that of the public.
If we were able to assemble, as a review board, a
group of civilians who were objective, fair-minded,
and also knowledgeable with respect to the police
behavior problems perhaps such a board would be
a good thing-provided, however, an additional
element is added: a firm commitment by the civil
rights and civil liberties groups to accept the findings and recommendations of such a board. All
these conditions are not likely to be met, and unless
they are, I disagree with Professor Packer as to the
desirability of this device as a control over the
police.
There would be little agitation for civilian review
boards if the concern were solely with police behavior in the investigation of the ordinary types of
criminal offenses. Some evidence of this is found in
the review board experience of Rochester, N.Y.
illustrations, see KAmAXAR, IwBAud& ARNOLD,
17
C aNAr JusrxcE IN OuR Tnm 99 (1965).
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During the period of a little over one year from the
establishment of the Board and the riots of July
1964, the Board received only two official complaints against the police for unnecessary force. As
a matter of fact, because of the inactivity of the
Board, the city administration was contemplating
its abolition. When the riots occurred, and the
civil rights groups complained of police brutality as
the cause of the riots, the city administration and
the police department were able to cite the low
incidence of prior complaints of unnecessary force.
Thereafter the complaints increased very considderably, and suspicion arose that perhaps the increase was due to the solicitation of some Board
members in order to justify the Board's continued
existence. Itis my understanding that the Rochester police department has in its files a number
of sworn depositions of complainants verifying
the fact of such solicitations.
The only other city with a police review board at
the present time is Philadelphia. What has been
the experience there? The Board, consisting of
civilians only, has been in existence for approximately 7 years. From October 1958 through
January 1965 the Board received 725 complaints.
333 were resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant without conducting hearings. In 38 cases
disciplinary action was recommended, in 15 of
which there were suspensions up to 30 days, and
in 23, official reprimands. In all the remaining cases
the Board made no recommendations against the
police.
What was the reaction of the civil rights groups
regarding the Philadelphia Board? The President
of the Philadelphia branch of the NAACP is reported as saying: "It ain't worth a damn!"'
The feelings and tensions are such throughout
the country today that, in my opinion, no police
18See New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 20, 1966.
19Several days after the Northwestern University
Conference at which this statement was made, the General Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People rejected the civilian
police review board plan proposed by Liberal-Republican Mayor Lindsay of New York City. It was said that
there were "serious inadequacies" in the plan, even
though the New York Civil Liberties Union considered
the plan as "not ideal but certainly a giant step forward". The National Director of the Congress of Racial
Equality objected to the plan on the ground that the
panel that Mayor Lindsay appointed to nominate members of the review board "fals to include representatives
from the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant ghettos and
civil rights organizations". New York Times, May 4,
1966, and May 5, 1966.
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review board would be acceptable to minority
groups generally unless it were composed of a majority of members who are in full sympathy with
their demands based upon their concept of proper
police behavior. 19 The disturbing feature about a
compliance with their demands is the fact that
some of the top leaders of the civil rights movement
have been openly condoning-and even advocating-unlawful conduct in the promotion of the
civil rights cause.
I can fully appreciate the concern of the police in
not wanting their conduct appraised by persons
who subscribe to the notion that a righteous cause
justifies the use of unlawful conduct to achieve the
desired objective.
In our efforts to preserve individual civil rights
and liberties, we cannot abolish the police and
other law enforcement agencies and still survive as
an orderly society; nor can we impose so many
restrictions upon them that they will be practically
powerless to prevent crime and apprehend criminnals. Our only alternative is to retain our police
forces and other law enforcement agencies and try
to act directly in improving their quality, their
efficiency, and their respect for individual civil
rights and liberties. It must be done through a
system whereby our police are selected and promoted on a merit basis, properly trained, adequately compensated, internally supervised with
respect to abusive and corrupt practices, and permitted to remain substantially free from politically
inspired interference. At the hands of policemen
within such a system there will be a minimum of
abusive practices, regardless of the race, color,
creed, or social status of the persons who become
involved in processes of the criminal law. Individual rights and civil liberties can survive-and
indeed flourish-in such an atmosphere. At the
same time there will be the protective security the
public needs and deserves.
I want to close with a statement made a short
while ago by Commissioner G. B. McClellan of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police." It expresses
his sentiment as well as mine:
When the policeman exceeds his authority,
bring him up short, but when he is doing, as
most of them are doing, a tough, thankless and
frequently dangerous job for you and for all
you hold dear, for God's sake get off his back.
"0An address delivered to the Canadian Club of
Toronto, Ontario, on March 29, 1965.

